contexploration

The book includes vivid observations on Iraqi everyday life, as it is written by two people “embedded” with family and friends. Interior of rooms, meals, conversations and atmosphere provides a helpful backdrop for those of us used to rely on the media and blogs for information from Iraq. As with life in Bosnia before the Yugoslav war, Iraqis were not obsessed with sectarian divisions before clerics, militia leaders and psychos like the Beheader General Abu Musab al-Zarqawi did their best to ignite them. Interethnic families were the norm more than the exception, it seams. In 2004 there was little indication of the mayhem that was to follow. Throughout the book, the news of terrorist attacks against civilians and worshipers were met with shock and bewilderment. The incompetence of the US provisional authority lead by Paul Bremer, together with the publication of pictures from the American soldiers’ prison abuse at Abu Ghraib, result in a lack of confidence in the US presence. Some Iraqis ask Østenstad and Salih Jaf, sincerely: “Is this what democracy means?”

Looting – a symbol of half-hearted commitment
Regime change and nation building are two different things. This is a central part of the critique of the Bush-administration's handling of the Iraq war - at least from those who supported the overthrow of Saddam Hussein from a humanitarian standpoint. Francis Fukuyama's new book [America at the Crossroads] includes a long chapter on this topic (Social engineering and the problem of development). One episode referred to repeatedly by the Iraqis interviewed in Østenstad and Salih Jaf’s book is the American soldiers’ indifference to the looting of government offices after Baghdad fell. This showed that the US had no plan for filling the power vacuum. Many Iraqis interpreted this to mean that US soldiers regarded ordinary Iraqis as subhuman, as “criminals” (but – it must be said – many Iraqis did act as criminals during the looting.) It seams as an correct analysis when Kenneth Adelman, in the Vanity Fair "neo con-interviews" [excerpt] said that this was a symbolic defeat for the American effort. The looting “totally discredited the idea of democracy, since this ‘democracy’ came in tandem with chaos.” Adelman, who served on the Defence Policy Board, said he quit because of such blunders from the administration.

The neoconservatives are frustrated with the Bush administration's handling of the war effort. They are especially critical of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. When the looting broke out, Rumsfeld responded indifferently:

“Freedom's untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things.”

In Journeys in the shadow of the war the Abu Ghraib scandal worsened the poor first impression of the Americans: The pictures showed the “true intentions” of the US, Iraqis thought. (Later, of course, the soldiers responsible for the abuse have received long prison sentences.) The book also points to another major factor that hampered attempts to win the support and cooperation of ordinary Iraqis: The many conspiracy theories circulating Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion. These theories are popular in the Middle East. (I have written about some of them here and here.) People speculated that the terrorist attacks were maybe orchestrated by the Americans themselves, giving them an excuse to stay in Iraq to keep “plundering” Iraq’s oil.

Fear and uncertainty
But perhaps the most interesting parts of the book deal with how Saddam was able to install a paralysing fear in the minds of each Iraqi. Like all other tyrants, he maintained a psychological republic of fear, to borrow the title of Kanan Makiya’s book on Iraq. In a conversation with secular Shiites in Baghdad, the extent of what Saddam knew or must have known about “his” people is discussed in the book. Did he know when people made jokes about him in the streets? In a heated exchange of opinions, one participant says:

“The atrocities of the al-Anfal Campaign was not Saddam’s fault. He was unaware. It must have been those around him who were to blame.”

“No, he knew everything that went on!”

“But if he knew everything, how come he was betrayed?”

The discussion progresses into chaos, with speculation on the extent of Saddam’s power. A woman says, nostalgically:

“When Saddam was strong, everyone applauded him. Now that he’s weak, everyone betrays him.”

Our tyrant
This goes to the core of the discussion. I’m sure every reader of this post have had their own speculations on how on earth dictators are able to sustain power over ordinary citizens. Take the example of the despot Fidel Castro. He has managed to stay in power for nearly five decades. In Oliver Stone’s documentary, Commandante, Castro comes across as a chauvinistic, uncharismatic fool. How is this clown able to preserve his power over the Cuban people? In the documentary, Castro claims he is just the “loyal servant” of his people. I am sure you are familiar with the argument: The Cubans are poor, your see, because of the sabotage perpetrated by the imperialists... Ordinary people here are preoccupied with just getting along in their daily lives... It's hard work... They have no need for such excess luxuries as human rights... In this transitory state of emergency it is better for the people to have Castro take care of important business, on their behalf…

Behind the scenes in a dictatorship, real oppression takes place, of course. But ordinary citizens must, to a certain extent, know that the dictator is in power because of their own fear and powerlessness. Surely, every tyrant has to be internalised in the head of every serf, as some kind of Sadist Superego. At the end of the heated discussion on Saddam Hussein in Journeys in the shadow of the war, one of the Iraqis suddenly blurts out:

“There was no Saddam! We didn’t know who he was! We invented him!”