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July 22, 2006

Humanity – Lovers of death and destruction

Congratulations on another week of excellent activity! We have managed to create mayhem in Mumbai, Baghdad, Beirut, Haifa and Mogadishu. Thank you to all those who took part. I know many of us may have perished during this working week, but congratulations to them as well! They helped raise the number of dead and thus contributed to even higher levels of mourning. There can never be enough blood and guts flowing in the streets of the world. But even though the number of dead and dismembered have increased steadily lately, there is still room for improvement. Take my advice to heart. Maybe we can boost the efficiency of our organization? There is no need for any pause in our activity now that we are on such a nice roll.

1.Always remember to take your vengeance out on the innocent!
What good is death and chaos unless it is inflicted on the innocent? Killing someone who is guilty of something just isn't the same. Locate the civilians. Choose the mothers and the children. Don’t spare the aid workers or the ambulances. Root people out from their places of worship. Make them flock to your bomb-trucks by offering them work or candy. Construct your shells devastating enough to ensure that you don’t just kill the original target, but his mother, father, children, siblings, neighbours, janitor and passers-by. Produce missiles that don't have remote control abilities, that have no target-lock, and then launch them over the border so as to increase the likelihood of causing maximum damaged to anyone who might be alive. Any death is better than no death.

2. Ignite hate by inventing things to hate!
If we don’t happen to be lucky enough to have a different race in close enough proximity for genocide, we must do everything in your power to invent other differences. A lot can be gained by establishing incomprehensible traditions that should be practiced at any cost. (If our neighbours actually allow us to practice our culture – kill them anyway, just because they are not willing to practice the same culture as us. Hurry before they submit!) If we are living in a peaceful and homogenous society, there is still plenty of potential for hate-construction. Try to construct an entirely different language. Force your children to uniform themselves. Then make them marry each other and have plenty of kids that look similar. Encourage the other side to do the same. Call those on your side “brothers and sister.” That means that the people on the other side are not your brothers and sisters. Then stretch out barbed wire fences. Erect concrete walls. But always make the borders fragile enough to ensure your re-entry when the massacres start. Nothing is more satisfying than seeing the blood of your former neighbour spilled on the ground of the streets where you used to play together as kids.

3. Make our Gods and Prophets different than the Gods and Prophets of the other side!
Claim that the only road to truth and love goes through our Prophet and our God – and remember to specify that there is only ONE God. Ours. And that we are his chosen people. Create hymns and poems about Love - the copyrighted version of Love that flows directly from our God, not theirs. Write books and pamphlets about our merciful and compassionate Prophet. And remember (and this is self-evident): Those who don’t believe in our God and our Prophet cannot be merciful and compassionate. Enhancing divisions creates a healthy environment of competition. Competition for the divine is the highest form of competition. Let the games begin!

4. Don’t be discouraged by signs of fatigue of war in your fellow men!
There is always enough hunger for death and destruction lurking in our souls. We can mobilize it, even in the last hours before a peace accord - in the final stages after centuries of combat - there is always just enough blood lust left to continue our industrious killing. Only look to our children! We must bring enough of them into life so that humanity has someone to slaughter - and to be slaughtered - in the future. Giving birth to as many children as possible also ensures an overpopulated environment that keeps humanity sufficiently preoccupied with internal fighting for survival. This makes our children easy to persuade that the world needs war. The next generations of humans will continue the path we have set forward for our species. To fight to death for the only cause worth living for: The joy of seeing other people suffer before we extinguish them.


LINKS: War-Torn Middle East Seeks Solace In Religion, from The Onion

July 20, 2006

Nettaksjonisme kan torpedere populismen

Guruer som Wikipedia-skaperen Jimmy Wales og oppfinneren av html, Tim Berners-Lee, har greid å mobilisere tusener av mennesker over landegrensene for en dugnadstanke som er demokratisk på grensen til det sosialistiske: Informasjon bør være gratis. Informasjon bidrar til frigjøring. Noen former for informasjon er mer sann enn andre former for informasjon. Slike prosjekter fører arven fra Opplysningen videre. Og det er ikke kapitalister, politikere eller kulturinstitusjonene som står bak – men vanlige borgere.

Ny Tids kronikk- og debattredaktør Halvor Finess Tretvoll ble i sommer intervjuet i Klassekampen (1.7). Temaet var venstresidens forhold til globalisering. I intervjuet presenterer Tretvoll noen problemstillinger som i større grad har vært fremme i svensk offentlighet: Er fattige lands krav om å få likeverdig tilgang på europeiske markeder for sine matvareprodukter og europeiske bønders krav på statlige landbrukssubsidier forenlige? Kan sosialdemokratiet utfordringer møtes også på overnasjonalt nivå? Kan et felles, europeisk arbeidsmarked være et gode?

Tretvolls refleksjoner i intervjuet har provosert enkelte. I en underlig kommentar i Klassekampen den 6.7 (”Billige fritenkere”) som delvis omhandler tiden da journalisten - Karin Haugen - var servitør i Reykjavík, skriver hun at Tretvoll argumenterer slik han gjør "fordi" han er skribent og fritenker. Tretvolls arbeidsplass er ikke utsatt for konkurranse fra globaliseringen, dermed har ikke argumentene hans noen tyngde, mener hun. To dager etterpå følger nestleder i SV, Audun Lysbakken, opp med en kommentarartikkel i Klassekampen hvor han mener Tretvoll tar feil i sine syn på globaliseringen fordi Tretvoll "tjener til sin sushi gjennom den best tenkelig beskyttede næring; synsing på norsk."

Hersketeknikk
Politisk debatt på Haugens og Lysbakkens premisser vil se slik ut: Kun de som jobber som yrkessjåfører har rett til å uttale seg om trafikken. All debatt om røykeforbud er forbeholdt røykerne. Kun de som har opplevd voldtekt kan uttrykke synspunkter om seksualisert vold. Skribenter har bare lov til å uttale seg om kontorrekvisita og tastaturfaglige spørsmål. Skulle jeg ha anvendt en slik argumentasjon overfor Lysbakken eller Haugen hadde jeg vært nødt til å diskvalifisere deres tanker om arbeiderklassen fordi de ikke selv er arbeidere: Journalister og politikere flyr jo bare rundt og snakker med folk. De går på møter. De sitter foran datamaskiner og har meninger.

Du kjenner sikkert til hvor frustrerende det er å skulle svare på slike angrep. Du har selv vært i diskusjoner hvor du plutselig får høre at du ”tar feil” fordi du har langt/kort hår, fordi du bor på vestkanten/østkanten, fordi du er mann/kvinne, fordi du har pene/slitte sko. ("Det er lett for deg å si, det! Du som…" blablabla.) Karin Haugen og Audun Lysbakken benyttet hersketeknikker overfor Tretvoll. Et par uker tidligere var det redaktøren i Klassekampen, Bjørgulv Braanen, som på nedlatende vis forsøkte å irettesette Tretvoll i en diskusjon om Eustonmanifestet. For å få den rette snerten over teksten sin tok Braanen like godt i bruk sitatfusk, et annet feigt knep. Det er på dette nivået redaksjonen til Klassekampen liker å legge debatten.

Denne form for personangrep og overdrivelser handler om dårlig personkjemi kamuflert som argumentasjon. Men all den tid nettskribenter og amatørjournalister fortviler over kvaliteten på den allmenne journalistikken og nivået på politisk debatt, finnes det også grunn til optimisme. Nettamatørene gjør selv sine spede forsøk på å utvide offentligheten, noe som kan være med på å endre vår måte å tenke politisk på. Gjennom internett har halvstuderte røvere oppfunnet helt nye verktøy for omtale av politiske spørsmål og deltakelse i den offentlig debatt. Jeg nevner kort: Blogging, podcasting, deltakerjournalistikk a la Ohmynews og nettleksikonet Wikipedia. (I all beskjedenhet minner jeg om at dette innlegget først ble publisert på Depesjer.no - en nettside som benytter et elegant publiseringsverktøy spesialutviklet av norske idealister.)

Fra kringkasting til informasjonsdemokrati
I sum har alle disse nyvinningene skapt en slags særegen kutyme for skriving av nettinnlegg: Du skal kunne vise frem dine kilder, du skal gi leseren mulighet til å etterprøve dine resonnementer, du bør være villig til å endre kurs dersom du blir presentert for gode motargumenter, og i den grad du skaper materiale selv bør du fortrinnsvis tilby det til alle - gratis. Disse prinsippene for kommentarskriving har til en viss grad smittet over i profesjonell journalistikk. Dette gjelder spesielt yngre kommentatorer og spaltister i avisene som ofte skriver på en måte som minner om nettinnlegg: Man henviser til googlifiserbare stikkord, man etterstreber å vise frem mer av tankegangen sin i stedet for å kun presentere konklusjonen av den, man åpner for interaksjon med leserne. Det kan finnes tusener av lesere der ute som vet mer om temaet og som er interessert i å kontakte journalisten via epost - eller delta på debatten på avisens nettside. Alt dette gjøres i håp om å kunne bidra til å opplyse en sak bedre.

Nylig leste jeg appellen fra oppfinneren av Wikipedia, Jimmy Wales: Open letter to the political blogosphere. Wales ønsker i første rekke å fokusere på politikernes kampanjer i valgkampene. Her pekes det på en del grunnleggende bestanddeler for en ny organisering av politisk debatt: Valgkampsdebatten må i større grad være faktabasert og deltakerne må være oppriktig i forhold til sine intensjoner. Viljen til å bidra til å opplyse samfunnsdebatten bør være viktigere enn politikernes narsissistiske poseringstrang. Initiativet til Jimmy Wales kan i beste fall være et prosjekt som transformerer måten politiske valgkamper drives. Men det kan også mislykkes. Denne risikoen vil profesjonelle aktører sjelden ta. Dersom en bedrift utfører et arbeid må de forsikre seg om at de får betalt. Dermed er det ofte amatører som ordner opp – slik Jimmy Wales gjorde da han startet Wikipedia.

Det vi et vitne til er at selve kringkastingstankegangen smadres. Ordet "kringkasting" (broadcast) er i seg selv arkaisk. Kringkasting viser til de gamle, statlige infrastrukturprosjektene slik som jernbanen og oppretting av telefonnettet. Informasjonen ble "kastet" ut til borgerne fra de statlige nyhetsekspertene. Dette var opplysning ovenifra og ned. Denne måten å fore befolkningen med informasjon på var nesten et slags folkehelsespørsmål som på mange vis minnet om kirkens misjonering den gangen kirken hadde monopol på kunnskap og undervisning. Formidling av filtrerte nyheter ga staten stor makt – en makt som både kunne bidra til utviklingen av et mer demokratisk samfunnsånd og som kunne misbrukes til å spre redselsfull nazistisk eller nasjonalistisk propaganda.

Nyheter og politisk debatt trenger sikre soner
I dag har man et kaos av medier som opererer side om side i offentligheten - bøker, aviser, radio, ukeblader, fjernsyn, film og internett. Borgernes medievaner vitner kanskje om at flertallet har en forkjærlighet for passiv avspenning i form av underholdning. Mange intellektuelle uttrykker derfor sin fortvilelse over det de anser for å være en barbarisk mediekultur dominert av vold, seksualitet og kjendiseri. Men alternativet til en vill medieverden er en sensurert medieverden. Politisk interesserte mennesker bør unngå å bli verdikonservative som følge av kulturens tilstand. La underholdning være underholdning.

Folket er ikke uten skyld i situasjonen som har oppstått. Det er borgernes egne nyhetspreferanser som gjør at mediene vinkler politikk som lett fordøyelig personkamp eller kjoledebatt. Dersom borgerne hadde etterlyst mer saklig, politisk informasjon, hadde de kommersielle mediene føyd seg. Men selv om flertallet av befolkningen kun orienterer seg om virkeligheten gjennom VG og TV2 Nyhetene, er medieverdenen full av muligheter. Det er ikke mindretallets oppgave å føye seg etter flertallets preferanser. Dersom man ønsker det er det fullt ut mulig å ta saken i egne hender og skape noe originalt på egen hånd.

Det er ikke vanskelig å se at underholdningsfikseringen kan gli inn i massemedienes dekning av samfunnsnyheter og politikk. Man kan kalle dette for en sammenblandingsfare. Det finnes flere eksempler på at det kan oppstå en farlig dynamikk hvis en tabloid form for nyhetsdekning går i symbiose med utforming av politikk. (I Danmark ble straffeloven skjerpet som følge av avisenes dekning av en kriminalitetsbølge som senere viste seg å være et rent medieskapt fantasimonster.) Nyhetsdekning og politisk debatt må rydde seg noen sikre soner i den underholdningsdominerte medieverdenen. Dette bør selvsagt ikke skje gjennom lovgivning eller annen regulering, men bør gjøres frivillig. Nyhetsredaksjonene kan for eksempel sette seg som mål å presentere mer faktastoff. Politikere og journalister kan bli enige om noen elementære spilleregler for spesielle debattprogrammer/spalter/nettsider.

Populismens dødsleie
Politikerforakt oppstår når politikere kun er opptatt av å være populære, gjøre karriére og komme seg i posisjon – ikke bedrive politisk håndverk. Når velgerne ser at ingen ting endres etter et regjeringsskifte - og når de ser at politikerne oppfører seg som selvopptatte klovner - utvikles det politikerforakt. Populistene slutter seg til folkets politikerforakt men tilbyr ingen helhetlig politikk. Høyre- og venstrepopulistene har derfor en forkjærlighet for latterliggjøring, hersketeknikker, enkle løsninger og de appellerer konsekvent til tanketomme gruppefølelser slik som nasjonal sjåvinisme og religion.

Man vil aldri greie å fjerne hersketeknikk fra samfunnsdebatten. Mennesket vil alltid ha sine mørke sider. Debattanter liker å demonstrere sitt nag mot de man er uenige med. Men vi - velgerne - kan endre premissene for politisk debatt ved å revolusjonere vår evne til å etterprøve utsagn og utforske nye sammenhenger på egen hånd. Vi kan skape verktøy for å utforske virkeligheten, i stedet for å la oss selv bli oppslukt av medievaner som har til hensikt å dra oss lenger og lenger inn i en virtuell, kommersiell underholdningsmaskin.

Husker du første gangen du prøvde programmet Google Earth? Det kom til syne en blå planet langt der inne i mørket. Du kunne zoome inn på et område, kjenne igjen nabolaget ditt. Du kunne se hvordan terrenget bølget. Du kunne reise hvor du ville i verden og utforske hvordan det så ut der. Gjennom internett kan vi skape prosjekter som gir en tilsvarende anledning til å dykke inn i verdens statistiske databanker, historiske arkiver og resultatene av vitenskaplig forskning. Hvorfor vente på at staten eller Microsoft skal ta initiativet? Noen anser at samfunnet vårt er i ferd med å viske ut Opplysningstidens bedrifter. Er det ikke mer nærliggende å konkludere med at Opplysningstiden så vidt har begynt?


VIDERE LESNING: Les: "Underbevisstheten er vår offentlighet." Les et intervju med Tim Berners-Lee. Bo Stråth mener at man trenger europeisk sosialpolitikk for å bekjempe populismen. Lena Lindgren mener populistene ikke taler på vegne av folket.

July 12, 2006

Four writers on Iran

The mullahs who hold power in Iran claim to know the will of God, and demand that all citizens must follow the “law of God,” which in Iran’s case refers to Islamic law based on the Koran. If the Islamic clergy are unsure of what position God would take on a certain matter, the question is resolved by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. If you take the ayatollah’s word for it when he says that he knows best what God wants, then this way of deciding law is a perfectly reasonable way of organizing society. If not, then the Ayatollah is a liar, and Iran is, in fact, a dictatorship.

In Iran, all candidates running for Parliament or President have to be approved by a 12-member “Guardian Council.” Six members of the Council are priests selected by the ayatollah. The other six members are lawyers proposed by Iran's Head of Judicial Branch, who again is himself appointed by the ayatollah. This makes Iranian elections a complete mockery. In the May 2005 presidential elections, 1014 candidates had registered to run. The Council only approved six of them.

The Iranian lawyer and human rights activist Shirin Ebadi published an excerpt from her book Iran Awakening: A Memoir of Revolution and Hope in the New York Times recently. The regime orders assassinations of foreign novelists and publishers, it supports Hezbollah in Lebanon and the suicide missions of Islamic Jihad in Israel. Iran was behind the suicide bomb attack against a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994, killing 100 people. But the majority of victims of the Iranian regime’s hunt for free thinkers, “infidels” and dangerous enemies like homosexuals and promiscuous girls, are, of course, Iranian citizens. While preparing a case where the Government had been complicit in assassinating Iranian intellectuals in the 1990’s, Shirin Ebati discovered she had been on the Government’s hit list herself. In a Government dossier, she found a transcript of a minister discussing with a death squad leader how to get rid of her. Ebati wrote:

My would-be assassin went to the minister of intelligence, requesting permission to carry out my killing. Not during the fasting month of Ramadan, the minister replied. But they don't fast anyway, the mercenary argued; these people have divorced God. It was through this belief — that the intellectuals, that I, had abandoned God — that they justified the killings as religious duty.

In March, the Norwegian writer Henrik Hovland held a brilliant lecture at the Nobel Peace Center in Oslo. He described the practical challenges of working as a war correspondent in Iraq. He has also been a UN war crimes tribunal investigator in Rwanda and an election observer in Guatemala. He expressed optimism on behalf of investigative journalism in armed conflicts. Recently he travelled to Iran and wrote a story for the Norwegian Dagbladet. In it, he depicts how the mullahs encourage the persecution of Iranian minorities like Zoroasters, Christians and Bahais. Hovland’s piece is beautifully written and is interactive to the point of being “interventionistic.” In the city of Esfahan he observes the Islamic Moharram celebrations. In an exhibition tent in memory of the soldiers killed in the Iraq-Iran war, Hovland gets into a discussion with a group of Iranians. Consider this excerpt:

The atmosphere in the tent is intense. A couple of youngsters ask me where I’m from and what I think about Islam. [Referring to the publication of the caricatures of Mohammad] they ask me why we Norwegians have tainted the Prophet. This is the start of a long and difficult conversation. On the hotel television, on BBC World, I hear Western leaders call for dialogue [between the West and Muslim countries], but practically it is tough to discuss with people that are convinced that they are in possession of the One and Only truth. While believers dressed in black cram around us, I try to explain freedom of speech. They do not grasp the concept. The people surrounding me have no idea about the political organization of Europe. I explain about the separation of powers in Western societies. They shake their heads and provide their own explanations. For them, the American intervention in Iraq, the French hijab-ban in schools, the nuclear controversy and the Scandinavian publications of the Muhammad cartoons are all part of the same attack on Islam. They tell me that Europeans are flocking to Islam. That’s why the US and Europe hates Islam. I try to clarify that European Muslims are mostly immigrants from other parts of the world, but they won’t accept that. I ask them what they think about the fact that Iran sentences people to death for converting from Islam to Christianity. They smile. These regime-faithful young men remind me of the young Stalinists I met in guerrilla camps in Latin-America during the Cold War. They have the same arrogance, the same ignorance, and they too are certain that they will triumph over the US and the West.

Three other outstanding writers have travelled to Iran recently, writing challenging reports for American magazines: Christopher Hitchens, Timothy Garton Ash and Michael Ignatieff [links follow]. Each of these provide different styles of writing, analysis and offer individual strategies of engagement with the Iranians they meet. Comparing the texts you can get a feel of how their core values influence their craft. They draw historical parallels, evaluate Iranian society ideologically and they all appear to have enjoyed their explorations of it.

Timothy Garton Ash starts off with a political science approach, describing the hierarchical system of institutions and government within the Iranian theocracy. He expresses his hopes for “Young Persia,” the discontented youth of the mullahs’ Revolution. From within the Iranian society he envisions a distinctly Iranian version of democracy emerging. He hopes that this will happen in the long run, as the “Young Persians” leave university and enter more powerful positions in society.

Christopher Hitchens invests much energy into portraying the undercurrent of Iranian society – the Iranians secret love of freedom and pleasure. But Hitchens also makes an effort to depict the theological superstructure of how it came about that the Iranians got it all wrong in the question of separating religion and politics. It makes an interesting read. Hitchens writes as if the mullahs actually mean what they are saying. (This realization that “they are not like me” is often a crucial igniter of healthy aversion towards religion.) Many of the young people Hitchens talks to express a naïve belief in that America could intervene militarily and put things straight. This annoys Hitchens somewhat. Hitchens writes: “It's a confession of powerlessness, an avoidance of responsibility, a demand that change come from somewhere else.”

Michael Ignatieff was invited to Iran in the fall of 2005 to lecture on human rights. He starts his essay by reflecting on Iranian hardships under the Iran-Iraq war. He portrays the revolutionary and nationalistic spirit that defines Iran – a culture that can be traced back some 2500 years. Ignatieff considers the impact of Ahmadinejad’s 2005 election victory over former Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In his lectures to Iranian students he argues that secularism doesn't mean crushing religion, but creating a neutral space where arguments are “settled by evidence, not dogma.” Noting that conversations with Iranians do become furtive when homosexual love is the topic, he interprets this hostility as a result of a war on pleasure waged by the mullahs. Ignatieff also mentions the plight of Armenian Christians and Bahais. He also pays respect to the memory of Iranian-Canadian Zahra Kazemi, who in 2003 was imprisoned for taking pictures outside the Evin prison in Tehran. She was subsequently raped, tortured and killed by the Iranian police.

At a seminar at Shahid Beheshti University, a group of female students appeal to Ignatieff for more outside pressure from Western intellectuals to help stop the mullahs’ application of Islamic law, including punishments such as stoning, whipping and amputations. Ignatieff oddly suggests that the students should try to reform the Islamic law system from within instead of appealing for the introduction of secular law, as in the West. An Iranian professor observing the exchange between Ignatieff and the students asks him if he can explain why he considers human rights to be universal. Ignatieff answers that there’s a certain inherited understanding of right and wrong in all people, and that “human rights law codifies our agreement about stopping these intuitively obvious injustices.” The professor replies that Ignatieff must be an intuitionist: “You need something stronger than this,” he says, hinting that religion would provide a better tool.

When I read this exchange I was embarrassed by Ignatieff’s frail defence of liberal democracy. There are two crucial distinctions that one should immediately introduce when confronted with a comparison between liberal democracies and Shariah rule. Religious law claims to be the word of God himself - dictated through the so called Prophets, and codified by those who declare that they are God’s representatives on earth, the clergy. Human rights and laws in liberal democracies, however, make no claim of divinity. They are explicitly invented, formulated and applied by men and women appointed through free elections. The second distinction is that while theocratic rule seeks moral uniformity through what it claims is “God’s legislation,” liberal democracies accept – and legally protect – individual, ethical orientations among its citizens.

These are the political distinctions. Now let me add some personal reflections. At the launch of a new issue of a lesbian gay fanzine in Oslo, I had a heated discussion with the editor. In one of her articles she wrote that the Jamaican authorities ought to prosecute and punish homophobic dancehall artists. While I share her disdain for the murder music of these miserable Jah-men, I object to any legal prosecution of them. In liberal democracies and secular societies, one of our strongest assets is the ability to be indifferent about other individuals’ attitudes, as well as the right to be allowed to preserve our own moral preferences intact.

Personally, I protest homophobia, and I enjoy expressing my contempt for superstitious moralists, but I would never bother to confront a nationalist, a homophobic or a religious devotee in order to convince him or that he is wrong. As long as they leave me alone and don’t hurt or abuse other people, I simply don’t care. If they prefer to live life as uptight fools, it’s their choice. They express their opinions. I express mine. I enjoy the fact that the laws of liberal democracies do not forbid idiocy. If you try to change other people’s weird belief systems by converting them, you are entering the realm of spastic, missionary zeal: You are becoming a moral imperialist. This is an activity that traditionally has been religion’s area of expertise. Let’s keep it that way.

The Iranian professor who challenged Michael Ignatieff doesn’t want to permit a legal framework which allows individual moral orientations. The professor craves a universal love. That is, he has a standardized, copyrighted vision of Love that he has been told is God’s own. Imagine the professor’s Utopia: What if everyone thought the same... if everyone had the same vision of the right and wrong way of living life... Wouldn't society be full of bliss? One would have no need of laws upheld by human authority. Everyone would agree. There would be peace.

Such a vision of ethical uniformity is the essence of religion. No ideology can streamline moral values more efficiently. The so called Prophets understood this. But if you have proclaimed universal love as the goal of your organization you must prepare for slaughter. Society will always host some infidels that will disagree with your interpretation of love, and in order to attain “universal love,” you will have to remove them, physically. This remains the curse that religious ideology has cast upon the world. The longing for universal love is often manifested through massacres.

Is it possible to foresee a turning point - a moment of true, democratic transformation of Iran - through a reading of Christopher Hitchens’ essay? Some of the Iranians who talked to Hitchens longed for an American intervention. This view of American salvation is perhaps the flip-side of all the conspiracy theories that claim that the USA, the CIA and the Jews are behind every horrible event in human history. (The Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, hinted in his public letter to George W. Bush that he believed that the 911 attacks themselves must have been organized by American secret services.) In this respect, the belief in USA as a Superpower is perhaps not unlike the belief in an Almighty God?

When enough Iranians, on their own, find out that they can’t bear another year of hypocrisy, another year of schizophrenia, they will speak their mind. As it is today, one suspects that the lack of individual autonomy symbolized by the belief in the Almighty/Superpower/Great Satan prevents the surfacing of real freedom in Iranian society as a whole.

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