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extract document nr

8044

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http://contexploration.net/extracts/8044.htm

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http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-09gore-speech.html   

http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/gore/gore092302sp.html

title

IRAQ AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

date published

2002-09-23

author

Former Vice President Al Gore

source

Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco

further reading from author

 

 

Quotes from Al Gore’s speech at Commonwealth Club, SF, September 23, 2002

 

Original link: http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-09gore-speech.html


Q & A: http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/gore/gore092302sp.html

 

Cache: LINK

Cache Q & A: LINK

 

Key quote:

 

“…The president should be authorized to take action to deal with Saddam Hussein as being in material breach of the terms of the truce and, therefore, a continuing threat to the security of the region. To this should be added that his continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is potentially a threat to the vital interests of the United States. But Congress should also urge the president to make every effort to obtain a fresh demand from the Security Council for prompt, unconditional compliance by Iraq within a definite period of time. If the Council will not provide such language, then other choices remain open.”

 

Quotes from speech:

 

“… all Americans should acknowledge that Iraq does indeed pose a serious threat to the stability of the Persian Gulf region, and we should be about the business of organizing an international coalition to eliminate his access to weapons of mass destruction. Iraq's search for weapons of mass destruction has proven impossible to completely deter, and we should assume that it will continue for as long as Saddam is in power. Now, let's be clear, there's no international law that can prevent the United States from taking action to protect our vital interests when it is manifestly clear that there is a choice to be made between law and our survival. Indeed, international law itself recognizes that such choices stay within the purview of all nations. I believe, however, that such a choice is not presented in the case of Iraq. Indeed, should we decide to proceed, our action can be justified within the framework of international law rather than requiring us to go outside the framework of international law. In fact, even though a new United Nations resolution might be helpful in the effort to forge an international consensus, I think it's abundantly clear that the existing U.N. resolutions passed 11 years ago are completely sufficient from a legal standpoint so long as it is clear that Saddam Hussein is in breach of the agreements made at the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War.”

”…We have a goal of regime change in Iraq, we have had for a number of years. We also have a clear goal of victory in the war against terror. In the case of Iraq, it would be difficult to go it alone, but it's theoretically possible to achieve our goals in Iraq unilaterally. Nevertheless, by contrast, the war against terrorism manifestly requires a multilateral approach. It is impossible to succeed against terrorism unless we have secured the continuing, sustained cooperation of many nations. And here's one of my central points; our ability to secure that kind of multilateral cooperation in the war against terrorism can be severely damaged in the way we go about undertaking unilateral action against Iraq. If the administration has reason to believe otherwise, it ought to share those reasons with the Congress, since it is asking Congress to endorse action that might well impair a much more urgent task - that is, continuing to disrupt and destroy the international terror network.”

”…Back in 1991, I was one of a handful of Democrats in the United States Senate to vote in favor of the resolution endorsing the Persian Gulf War. And I felt betrayed by the first Bush administration's hasty departure from the battlefield, even as Saddam began to renew his persecution of the Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the south - groups that we had after all encouraged to rise up against Saddam.”

 

“… But look at the differences between the resolution that was voted on in 1991 and the one this administration is proposing that the Congress vote on in 2002. The circumstances are really completely different. To review a few of them briefly: in 1991, Iraq had crossed an international border, invaded a neighboring sovereign nation and annexed its territory. Now by contrast in 2002, there has been no such invasion. We are proposing to cross an international border and, however justified it may be, we have to recognize that the difference in the circumstances now compared to what existed in 1991 has profound implications for the way the rest of the world views what we are doing. And that in turn will have implications for our ability to succeed in our war against terrorism.”


”…What makes Saddam dangerous is his effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction. What makes terrorists so much more dangerous than they have ever been is the prospect that they may get access to weapons of mass destruction. There isn't just one country that is attempting to get access, nor is there just one terrorist group. We have to recognize that this is a whole new era and the advances in the technology of destruction require us to think anew. As Abraham Lincoln famously said, ”As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.” Another difference; in 1991 there was a resolution that had been passed by the United Nations. This time - although I don't think we need one if he's in breach as he is - we nevertheless went to the United Nations to ask for one and thus far we have not been successful in getting it.”

”…Here's another of the main points I want to make. If we quickly succeed in a war against the weakened and depleted fourth-rate military of Iraq and then quickly abandon that nation, as President Bush has quickly abandoned almost all of Afghanistan after quickly defeating a fifth-rate military power there, then the resulting chaos in the aftermath of a military victory in Iraq could easily pose a far greater danger to the United States than we presently face from Saddam. Here's why I say that; we know that he has stored away secret supplies of biological weapons and chemical weapons throughout his country. As yet, we have no evidence, however, that he has shared any of those weapons with terrorist groups. If the administration has evidence that he has, please present it, because that would change the way we all look at this thing. But if Iraq came to resemble Afghanistan, in its current depleted state, with no central authority - well, they have a central authority, but their central authority, because the administration's insistence that the international community not be allowed to assemble a peace keeping force large enough to pacify the countryside, that new government in Afghanistan controls a few precincts in one city and the warlords or drug lords control the whole rest of the countryside. What if in the aftermath of a war against Iraq, we face a situation like that because we washed our hands of it? What would then happen to all of those stored reserves of biological weapons all around the country? What if the Al Qaeda members infiltrated across the borders of Iraq the way they are in Afghanistan? Then the question wouldn't be, Is Saddam Hussein going to share these weapons with the terrorist group? The terrorist groups would have an enhanced ability to just walk in there and get them.”

”I just think that if we end the war in Iraq the way we ended the war in Afghanistan, we could very well be worse off than we are today. When you ask the administration about this, what's their intention in the aftermath of a war, Secretary Rumsfeld was asked recently about what our responsibility would be for re-stabilizing Iraq in the aftermath of an invasion, and his answer was, ”That's for the Iraqis to come together and decide.” On the surface you can understand the logic behind that, and this is not an afterthought. This is based on administration policy. I vividly remember that during one of the campaign debates in 2000, Jim Lehrer asked then-Governor Bush whether or not America, after being involved with military action, should engage in any form of nation building. The answer was, ”I don't think so. I think what we need to do is convince people who live in the lands they live in to build the nations. Maybe I'm missing something here. We're going to have kind of a nation-building corps in America? Absolutely not.” My point is, this is a Bush doctrine. This is administration policy. Given that it is administration policy, we have to take that into account as a nation in looking at the likely consequences of an overwhelming American military victory against the government of Iraq. If we go in there and dismantle them - and they deserve to be dismantled - but then we wash our hands of it and walk away and leave it in a situation of chaos, and say, ”That's for y'all to decide how to put things back together now,” that hurts us.”

 

“…The president should be authorized to take action to deal with Saddam Hussein as being in material breach of the terms of the truce and, therefore, a continuing threat to the security of the region. To this should be added that his continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is potentially a threat to the vital interests of the United States. But Congress should also urge the president to make every effort to obtain a fresh demand from the Security Council for prompt, unconditional compliance by Iraq within a definite period of time. If the Council will not provide such language, then other choices remain open. In any event, the president should be urged to take the time to assemble the broadest possible international support for his course of action. Anticipating that the president will probably still move toward unilateral action, the Congress should establish now what the administration's thinking is regarding the aftermath of a U.S. attack for the purpose of regime change. I believe that the congressional resolution should also make explicitly clear that authorities for taking these actions are to be presented as derivatives from existing Security Council resolutions and from international law, not requiring any formal new doctrine of preemption, which remains to be discussed subsequently in view of its great gravity.”


”The issue before us is whether we now face circumstances so dire and so novel that we must choose one objective over another. It is reasonable to conclude that we face a very serious problem in Iraq. But is a general doctrine of preemption based on a theory that would overturn the international law and the structure that has existed since our victory in WWII? Is that necessary? No. I believe not. Does Saddam Hussein present an imminent threat to the United States? And if he did, would the United States be free to act without international permission? If he presents an imminent threat we would be free to act under generally accepted understandings of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which reserves to states the right to act in self-defense. If he does not present an imminent threat, then is it justifiable for the administration to be seeking by every means to precipitate an immediate confrontation, to find a cause for war and to launch an attack? There is a case to be made that further delay only works to Saddam Hussein's advantage, and the clock should be seen to have been running on the issue of compliance for a decade, therefore not needing to be reset again to the starting point. But to the extent that we have any concern about international support, whether for its political or material value or for its necessity in winning the war against terrorism, hurrying the process could be costly. Even those who now agree that Saddam Hussein must go may divide deeply over the wisdom of presenting the United States as impatient for war.”


Answers to Written Questions from the Floor:

“…I alluded to it in my remarks. Once we pushed the Taliban out of power, I believe that we should have had a force of 30,000 to 35,000 international troops to come into Afghanistan and do like we did in Bosnia, and say, ”Ok, y'all, there's a new sheriff in town, and just calm down.” And after a while their blood pressure goes down and after awhile their general expectation of violence and conflict is replaced with a general expectation of cooperation. That was not done in Afghanistan. Many in our military advised that it be done. Many people close to the president, I read, advised that it be done. I don't know why it wasn't done, but if I had anything to say about it, it would have been done and would've been done very differently from the way it has been.”

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